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1. INTRODUCTION
Given the extraordinary complexity of the human body, it is no surprise
that we do not know all of the effects that stem from a given pharmaceutical
product. Certain prescription drugs might turn out to be dangerous or even fatal
to some users, while providing great benefits to others. Unfortunately, any time
a drug with widespread application is accompanied by a known, albeit perhaps
rare, side effect, chances are great that someone is eventually going to be
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harmed.' Such risks can readily be disclosed in concrete terms so that physi-
cians have the information necessary to balance the risks and benefits in decid-
ing whether to prescribe the medication for any particular patient. In many
situations, however, science has not yet definitively determined whether a pur-
ported side effect is causally connected with a particular medicine. The state of
knowledge on such products is more limited - based, for example, on adverse
incident reports and as yet inconclusive studies. This creates something of a
conundrum when it comes to warnings on these products. On one hand, for
warnings to fully apprise physicians of the dangers, they must have sufficient
force. On the other, if the medical knowledge of a given drug, at a given time,
is inconclusive, a warning that accompanies that product - assuming accuracy
is desired - will obviously not be able to state a causal link. As such, while
warnings can readily disclose known risks in concrete terms, warnings that ap-
prise doctors of potential risks might by comparison appear more equivocal.
Our focus is on the latter category.
In this short piece, we will argue that the absence of a proven causal
connection should not preclude a warning from being adequate as a matter of
law. We suggest that the impulse to categorically reject a warning as "equivo-
cal" by virtue of an uncertain causal connection should be rejected. Instead,
manufacturers in such circumstances should be able to accurately disclose what
they know and, thereby, conform their conduct to a known rule of law. Fur-
thermore, while the mere mention of an ailment standing alone will not neces-
sarily absolve manufacturers of liability, when a warning reasonably describes
the state of scientific knowledge regarding the specific condition that later be-
falls a patient, it should be given significant weight in the analysis.
In Part 11, we will briefly survey the so-called learned intermediary doc-
trine. In Part III, we will analyze and critique the reasoning of a recent circuit
opinion that declined to find a manufacturer's warning adequate as a matter of
law in light of an uncertain causal connection between the drug and the pur-
ported effects. In Part IV, we will further argue that such an approach should be
rejected given that it ignores or minimizes: (i) whether or not the specific risk
was described; (ii) the purposes of the learned intermediary doctrine; (iii) the
One court gave the following cogent explanation:
[T]he reality is that when a medication causes a rare and serious side effect,
the result is both frustrating and horrifying to the patient. Yet, from a public
policy standpoint, our legal system has determined that so long as medical
providers follow certain established precautions such as educating health-care
providers, these calculated risks are acceptable given the tremendous benefits
medicine can provide. As anyone who has had a family member's life saved or
improved through medication knows, modem medicine can be truly astonish-
ing. It is unfortunate that on a rare occasion it carries with it catastrophic re-
sults.
Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., No. CivA. 3:99CV-649-R, 2001 WL 34065029, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 8,
2001), affld 2005 WL 434467 (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 2005).
[Vol. 107
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position of the Food and Drug Administration; and (iv) the effects on manufac-
turers, doctors, and patients.
II. THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE
In general, manufacturers are strictly liable for the harm caused by,,2
products that are "unreasonably dangerous. However, as an exception to this
principle, prescription drugs are considered "unavoidably unsafe" in that they
are "quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use."
3
Recognizing this, the vast majority of states have adopted the "learned interme-
diary doctrine," under which a pharmaceutical manufacturer is not held liable if
it provides an "adequate warning" to prescribing physicians, who, acting as
"learned intermediaries," then apply their professional judgment to weigh the
risks and benefits in individual cases.4 With respect to prescription drugs, "[tihe
duty to provide adequate warnings arises only when the manufacturer knows or
should know of a risk posed by the product" and "extends only to the medical
profession, not the consumer."
5
The primary rationale for the learned intermediary doctrine is to assume
a proper balance of responsibility between the doctor, who interacts with pa-
tients on an individual basis, and the manufacturer, which mass produces the
drugs.6 As one court has noted,
2 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A (1965).
3 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, cmt. k (1965) ("There are some products which, in
the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended
and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs."); see, e.g., Ziliak v. Astra-
Zeneca LP, 324 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying Indiana law).
4 See Thorn v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 852 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting that
"[florty-four other jurisdictions have adopted the learned intermediary doctrine in prescription
medicine cases" and predicting that Wyoming would follow suit); see also In re Norplant Contra-
ceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 215 F. Supp. 2d 795, 806 (E.D. Tex. 2002) ("[T]he doctrine either
applies or is recognized ... in 48 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico."), quoted in
Ehlis v. Shire Richwood, Inc., 367 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2004); Doe v. Solvay Pharms., Inc.,
350 F. Supp. 2d 257, 271 (D. Me. 2004) (collecting cases); Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829,
838 n. 11 (Conn. 2001) (same). For a more extensive history of the learned intermediary doctrine,
see, e.g., Timothy S. Hall, Reimagining the Learned Intermediary Rule for the New Pharmaceuti-
cal Marketplace, 35 SEToN HALL L. REv. 193, 199-226 (2004).
5 Ziliak, 324 F.3d at 521.
6 See, e.g, Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 976 F.2d 77 (lst Cir. 1992)
("The rationale underlying the prescription drug rule is that the prescribing
physician, as the 'learned intermediary' standing between the manufacturer
and consumer/patient, is generally in the best position to evaluate the potential
risks and benefits of ingesting a certain drug and to advise the patient accord-
ingly. Under this doctrine, the manufacturer's duty is fulfilled once it ade-
quately warns the physician.")
Garside, 976 F.2d at 80; Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 758, 763 (Ky. 2004) ("The first and
2005]
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Prescription drugs are likely to be complex medicines, esoteric
in formula and varied in effect. As a medical expert, the pre-
scribing physician can take into account the propensities of the
drug as well as the susceptibilities of his patient. His is the task
of weighing the benefits of any medication against its potential
dangers. The choice he makes is an informed one, an individu-
alized medical jud rnent bottomed on a knowledge of both pa-
tient and palliative.
The learned intermediary defense consists of two hurdles that the plaintiff must
overcome for a court to hold the manufacturer liable. To avoid summary judg-
ment, the plaintiff must put forth evidence (a) that the warning is inadequate and
(b) that the deficiency is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries.8
While the focus of this Article is on the first prong, sometimes the two
become muddled, so for clarity we will first briefly describe the second. Under
the second prong, even if the warning is inadequate, the causal chain is broken if
the outcome would remain unchanged with an adequate warning.9  In other
best rationale is that the prescribing physician is in a superior position to impart the warning and
can provide an independent medical decision as to whether use of the drug is appropriate for
treatment of a particular patient.").
7 Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Ferrara v. Berlex
Labs., Inc., 732 F.Supp. 552, 555 (E.D. Pa. 1990) ("The rationale behind this doctrine is simply
stated. In the dispensing of prescription drugs, the physician is required to act as a learned inter-
mediary between the manufacturer and patient because of the complexity of medicines and the
doctor's medical knowledge."), aff'd 914 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1990).
8 See, e.g., Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 984, 991 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ("A plaintiff
asserting causes of action based on a failure to warn must prove not only that no warning was
provided or the warning was inadequate, but also that the inadequacy or absence of the warning
caused the plaintiff's injury." (citations omitted)), affd 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004); In re
Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 331 F. Supp. 2d 196, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("A plaintiff in a prescrip-
tion drug failure to warn case therefore has the burden of proving that (1) the warning to the phy-
sician was defective, and (2) the inadequate warning proximately caused the plaintiffs injury, i.e.,
that adequate warnings would have persuaded the physician not to prescribe the drug in question."
(applying Texas and Mississippi law)).
Some states adopt a rebuttable presumption such that "once the plaintiff establishes that the manu-
facturer provided inadequate warnings, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that an adequate
warning would not have affected the doctor's conduct in prescribing the drug" while "in states that
have not adopted the rebuttable presumption, the plaintiff in a prescription drug case bears the full
burden of proving through affirmative evidence that the inadequate warning was the proximate
cause of the injury." Motus, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 991; see, eg., Thom, 353 F.3d at 855 (employing
rebuttable presumption in application of Wyoming law); Ralston v. Smith & Nephew Richards,
Inc., 275 F.3d 965, 977 n.6 (10th Cir. 2001) (same, Kansas law).
9 See, e.g., Moms v. Pfizer Inc., 358 F.3d 659, 660-61 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[E]ven if Pfizer's
warnings concerning Zoloft and suicide were deficient, on the facts of this case, Motus failed to
establish that Pfizer's allegedly inadequate warnings contributed to her husband's suicide."); Tho-
mas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1992)
[Vol. 107
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words, if the doctor would have prescribed the drug regardless, proximate cau-
sation is lacking.10 For example, the doctor might have been fully apprised of
the risks from an independent source and, in her best judgment, concluded that
the benefits outweighed the risks.11  Alternatively, whether or not fully in-
formed, the doctor's decision might have been impervious to the strength of the
warning. 12 In some cases, the doctor fails to read the warnings at all.1
3
Turning now to the first prong, an adequate warning is one that is rea-
sonable under the circumstances. 4 While often a factual question for the jury,
courts routinely find warnings adequate as a matter of law. 15 In Ziliak v. Astra-
("Assuming arguendo that the warning was inadequate, [plaintiff] still had the
burden of showing that an adequate warning would have altered [the doctor's]
conduct.... [11n a prescription drug failure to warn case, the plaintiff must es-
tablish that an adequate warning would have convinced the treating physician
not to prescribe the product for the plaintiff.").
Thomas, 949 F.2d at 812 (citing in part from Wyeth Labs., Inc. v. Fortenberry, 530 So.2d 688, 691
(Miss. 1988)).
1o See, e.g., Wheat v. Pfizer, Inc., 31 F,3d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 1994) (proximate cause can be
established only if "'a proper warning would have changed the decision of the treating physician,
i.e., that but for the inadequate warning, the treating physician would not have used or prescribed
the product' (quoting Willett v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 929 F.2d 1094, 1099 (5th Cir. 1991) and apply-
ing Louisiana law)); Thomas v. Hoffman-La Roche, 949 F.2d 806, 812 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[I]n a
prescription drug failure to warn case, the plaintiff must establish that an adequate warning would
have convinced the treating physician not to prescribe the product for the plaintiff." (applying
Mississippi law)).
11 See, e.g., Ellis v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 311 F.3d 1272, 1283 n.8 (1 th Cir. 2002) (applying Geor-
gia law and noting that warning was not inadequate where doctors had actual knowledge of the
risks); Christopher v. Cutter Labs, 53 F.3d 1184, 1192 (11 th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he causal link be-
tween a patient's injury and the alleged failure to warn is broken when the prescribing physician
had 'substantially the same' knowledge as an adequate warning from the manufacturer should
have communicated to him." (citation omitted)); Harden v. Danek Med. Inc., 985 S.W.2d 449,
451 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) ("[I]t is generally held that the learned intermediary doctrine may
shield a manufacturer from liability when the physician was independently aware of the risks
involved.").
12 See, e.g., Motus, 358 F.3d at 661 ("[A] product defect claim based on insufficient warnings
cannot survive summary judgment if stronger warnings would not have altered the conduct of the
prescribing physician."); Ralston, 275 F.3d at 977 (holding causation lacking because, even with
different warning, doctor's decision to use product would have remained the same).
13 See Motus, 358 F.3d at 661 ("Because the doctor testified that he did not read the warning
label that accompanied Zoloft or rely on information provided by Pfizer's detail men before pre-
scribing the drug to Mr. Motus, the adequacy of Pfizer's warnings is irrelevant to the disposition of
this case.").
14 See, e.g., Ziliak, 324 F.3d at 521; Ralston v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 275 F.3d 965,
975 (10th Cir. 2001); Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981);
see also Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Bailey, 878 So.2d 31, 55 (Miss. 2004); McCombs v. Syn-
thes (U.S.A.), 587 S.E.2d 594, 595 (Ga. 2003).
15 See, e.g., Ehlis v. Shire Richwood, Inc., 367 F.3d 1013 (8th Cir. 2004); Ziliak, 324 F.3d
2005]
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Zeneca, for example, the Seventh Circuit had little difficulty in finding a warn-
ing adequate where the doctor was reasonably made aware of the specific riskS 16
that ultimately materialized. One common formulation of the doctrine states
that a warning is adequate as a matter of law if it is "accurate, clear and unambi-
guous."' 17  On the flip side, summary judgment on this issue is not proper if, as
one court put it, the warning did "not convey a fair indication of the nature of
the dangers involved, was reluctant and equivocal in tone and lacked a sense of
urgency." is
However, it may be far from "clear and unambiguous" how to meet this
standard when the causal connection between the drug and a type of affliction is
uncertain. One recent case, Thorn v. Bristol-Myers Squibb,19 suggests that
when the manufacturer's warning fails to unequivocally state that a drug can
cause the plaintiffs affliction the warning cannot be adequate as a matter of law
- even when there is no evidence either that the manufacturer knew of a causal
connection or, indeed, that a causal connection exists at all.
20
The thrust of this article is that, while it is true that a causal link be-
tween a drug and a purported side effect might be unknown to the manufacturer
or to science in general, it should nonetheless be possible for a pharmaceutical
company's warning to be adequate as a matter of law - by reasonably convey-
ing the current state of knowledge regarding potential risks. When a company is
518; Stahl v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 2002); Ralston, 275 F.3d 965;
Plummer v. Lederle Labs., 819 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1987); Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 295
F.Supp. 2d 693 (ED. Ky. 2003); Pittman v. Upjohn Co., 890 S.W.2d 425, 429 (Tenn. 1994); Felix
v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 540 So.2d 102 (Fla. 1989); but see Thorn v. Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co., 353 F.3d 848, 857-58 (10th Cir. 2003); Amore v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 748 F.Supp. 845,
854 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
16 Ziliak, 324 F.3d at 521 (noting that "pharmaceutical manufacturer [had] warn[ed] doctors
that specific adverse side effects are associated with the use of a drug"); see also Ralston v. Smith
& Nephew Richards, Inc., 275 F.3d 965, 976 (10th Cir. 2001) ("[Tlhe warnings provided by
Smith & Nephew reasonably cautioned against each of the specific risks alleged by Ralston.").
17 Felix, 540 So.2d at 105; see also Pittman, 890 S.W.2d at 429 ("The adequacy of a drug
manufacturer's warning... becomes a question of law only when the instructions are accurate and
unambiguous."). In Pittman, the court cites five criteria in holding that a warning was adequate:
1. the warning must adequately indicate the scope of the danger; 2. the warn-
ing must reasonably communicate the extent or seriousness of the harm that
could result from misuse of the drug; 3. the physical aspects of the warning
must be adequate to alert a reasonably prudent person to the danger; 4. a sim-
ple directive warning may be inadequate when it fails to indicate the conse-
quences that might result from failure to follow it and, ... 5. the means to
convey the warning must be adequate.
Id. (quoting Serna v. Roche Labs., 684 P.2d 1187, 1189 (N.M. App. 1984)).
18 Williams v. Lederle Labs., 592 F.Supp. 381, 385 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
19 353 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 2003).
20 Id. at 857-58 (10th Cir. 2003) (applying Wyoming law).
[Vol. 107
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able to conform to a known rule of law, all parties are better off and the princi-
ples driving the learned intermediary doctrine are vindicated.
III. THOM V. BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO.
Steven Thorn sought treatment for depression and sleep difficulties.
21
Unfortunately, after taking a prescription anti-depressant called Serzone, manu-
factured by Bristol-Myers Squibb ("BMS"), he developed a condition know as
"priapism" - a "persistent erection of the penis, accompanied by pain and ten-
derness, resulting from a pathologic condition rather than sexual desire." 22 Mr.
Thom, now left with permanent penile injury, brought suit against BMS.
In this case, BMS had included an FDA-approved package insert spe-
cifically warning doctors that "rare reports of priapism have been received sinceS,,23
market introduction. The trial court granted summary judgment to the manu-
facturer noting that "[q]uite simply, a manufacturer should not be held liable for
having failed to warn in an instance where, in fact, it warned of the very injury
of which plaintiff complains." 24 It rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the
warning should have been stronger because "[w]hen a warning as to a particular
21 Id. at 850.
22 Id. (quoting STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1425 (26th ed. 1995)).
23 Id. As described by the court, the physician package insert, at the time Serzone was pre-
scribed to Mr. Thom, read in pertinent part:
PRECAUTIONS
Priapism
While priapism did not occur during pre-marketing experience with nefa-
zodone [the scientific name of Serzone], rare reports of priapism have been
received since market introduction. A causal relationship to nefazodone has
not been established (see ADVERSE REACTIONS Section). If patients pre-
sent with prolonged or inappropriate erections, they should discontinue ther-
apy immediately and consult their physicians. If the condition persists for




Post marketing experience with SERZONE has shown an adverse experience
profile similar to that seen during the premarketing evaluation of nefazodone.
Voluntary reports of adverse events temporally associated with SERZONE
have been received since market introduction that are not listed above and for
which a causal relationship has not been established. These include:
Rare occurrences of... priapism (see PRECAUTIONS Section).
24 Thom v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, No. 01-CV-033-J (D. Wyo. 2002).
2005]
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risk has been provided, a demand for a stronger or more prominent warning is
not supported by the law."
25
The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the adequacy of the warning
was a question of fact for a jury.26 The court supplied three reasons in support
of this conclusion. First, the language on the package insert was too "equivo-27 • 
cal" to be adequate as a matter of law. Second, there is a "factual controversy
regarding the state of BMS's knowledge of priapism" and the relationship be-
tween Serzone and another BMS drug. Third, "there is also a dispute as to
whether the instruction to seek medical treatment accurately conveyed the mag-
nitude of the harm, and whether it caused confusion when following the instruc-
tion to discontinue treatment." 29 Each of these reasons fails to withstand scru-
tiny and we consider each in turn.
First, the court found the warning to be too "equivocal" to qualify for
adequacy as a matter of law.30 Providing little analysis, the court did not di-
rectly explain why it was too equivocal. 31 It first noted that "[t]he mere mention
of a possible injury ... is not necessarily adequate." 32 It then seemed to imply
that the failure to be adequate as a matter of law was rooted in the warning's
failure to state a causal relationship between priapism and nefazodone (the sci-
entific name of Serzone). 33 After pointing out that the Serzone warning failed to
state a causal connection, 34 the court cited cases where the respective warnings
"did not unequivocally state that there was a causal relationship," stated that a
"causal relationship has not been established," and stated that adverse effects
were "unconfirmed. 3 5 Thorn contrasted these with warnings that "stated [that
a] potentially 'life-threatening' side effect was reported and indicated the pri-
25 Id. at 11 (citing Caveny v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 818 F.Supp. 1404, 1406 (D. Colo. 1992)).
26 Thorn, 353 F.3d at 853-55.
27 Id at 853-54.
28 Id. at 854.
29 Id. at 855.
30 Id. at 853-54.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 853 (citing Stahl v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 283 F.3d 244, 266-67 (5th Cir. 2002)
(interpreting the Louisiana Products Liability Act)).
33 Id. at 853-54.
34 Id. at 853 ("[T]he package insert for Serzone indicated only that 'rare reports' of priapism
were 'temporally associated' with Serzone; it further stated that a 'causal relationship [of priap-
ism] to nefazodone has not been established."').
35 Thorn, 353 F.3d at 853-54 (citing Amore v. G.D. Searle & Co., 748 F.Supp. 845, 852 (S.D.
Fla. 1990); Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1363 (4th Cir. 1975); Tongate v. Wyeth
Labs., 220 Ill. App. 3d 952, 962 (1999)).
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mary cause and management of it" or "noted that a 'causal relationship [was]
probable. In other words, it appears that the court was unwilling to consider
any warning adequate if it expresses a lack of causation because such a warning
would be too equivocal. This approach effectively rules out adequate warnings
as a matter of law for any product where there have been anecdotal reports of
potential side-effects, but where a causal connection does not exist - or at least
has not yet been proven - even if the warnings effectively convey the extent of
the manufacturer's knowledge.
37
Second, the court found a factual controversy as to BMS's knowledge of
Serzone, which in turn bears on the adequacy of its warning. 38 However, the
court pointed to no evidence offered by the plaintiffs that would show a causal
connection between Serzone and priapism - let alone BMS's knowledge of
such a connection.
At most, the evidence demonstrates that BMS knew of a similarity be-
tween Serzone and an earlier drug called trazodone, and that there is an "asso-
ciation" between trazodone and priapism.39 Even assuming that Serzone and
trazodone are identical, this merely shows that BMS constructively knew of an
association between Serzone and priapism. Of course, an "association," dem-
onstrated, for example, via adverse incident reports, stops far short of establish-
ing causation.
4 0
36 Id. (citing Jacobs v. Dista Products Co., 693 F.Supp. 1029, 1032 (D.Wyo. 1988); Caveny v.
CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 818 F.Supp. 1404, 1405 (D. Colo. 1992)).
37 Regulations require manufacturers to submit certain "adverse drug experience" reports, also
known as "adverse incident reports," to the FDA. See 21 C.F.R. § 310.305 (2002); 21 C.F.R. §
314.80 (2004). An "adverse drug experience" is "[a]ny adverse event associated with the use of a
drug in humans, whether or not considered drug related." 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.305(b), 314.80(a).
Such reports do not constitute "an admission that the drug caused or contributed to an adverse
effect." 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.305(g), 314.80(k). The FDA also receives voluntary reports of adverse
events from health care professionals and consumers. See, e.g., 69 Fed. Reg. 21,778, at 21,789
(Apr. 22, 2004) ("While drug manufacturers are required to notify FDA of certain adverse drug
events, reports from individuals and health care professionals are voluntary.").
38 Thom, 353 F.3d at 854 ("Because the duty to warn arises only when the manufacturer
knows or should know of the risk, the adequacy of a warning is commensurate with the manufac-
turer's knowledge of the effects of the drug."). In acknowledging this fact, the court should have
noticed the tension between requiring a warning commensurate with the defendant's knowledge
and requiring a statement of causation regardless of the defendant's knowledge (i.e. finding any
warnings lacking such a statement to be too "equivocal").
39 Id. ("A little over a year after trazodone was introduced into the marketplace, published peer
review medical articles began reporting the association between trazodone and priapism." (em-
phasis added) (citing Gerald M. Aronoff, Trazodone Associate with Priapism, 1 LANCET 856
(1984); Maryonda Scher et at., Trazodore and Priapism, 140 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 1362 (1983)).
40 David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 91 (Federal Judicial Center, 2d ed. 2000) ("Observational stud-
ies can establish that one factor is associated with another, but considerable analysis may be nec-
essary to bridge the gap from association to causation."); see also id. ('Anecdotal evidence'
means reports of one kind of event following another. Typically, the reports are obtained haphaz-
2005]
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In any case, such an association had already been admitted by BMS on
the package insert: priapism had been "temporally associated with SERZONE"
in "[v]oluntary reports of adverse events. The introduction of trazodone into
the equation did little more than inject an irrelevant question of fact into the
mix. Even assuming a complete identity between the two drugs and BMS's
knowledge thereof, it should not detract from the warning's adequacy because
none of the evidence cited indicates that BMS knew of a causal link (or indeed
that such a link exists) - merely an "association" - between the drug and the
adverse incident. Therefore, the court's argument that "such evidence is rele-
vant in determining the adequacy of the Serzone warning because it goes to the
state of BMS's actual and constructive knowledge of the risk of priapism from a
drug BMS admits to 'hav[ing] some structural similarity' with Serzone" is un-
persuasive.
42
Third, the court found a question of fact as to "whether the instruction to
seek medical treatment accurately conveyed the magnitude of the harm, and
whether it caused confusion when following the instruction to discontinue
treatment." 43 However, the warning appears rather clear: "[i]f patients present
with prolonged or inappropriate erections, they should discontinue therapy im-
mediately and consult their physician."'44 Even without this urgent directive, a
certain amount of common sense suggests what constitutes a "prolonged or in-
appropriate" length of time in these circumstances. The court placed great
weight upon the subsequent sentence which states that "[i]f the condition per-
sists for more than 24 hours, a urologist should be consulted to determine ap-
propriate management," and asserts that this creates a question of fact because
there is evidence suggesting that the "state of the medical knowledge is that
priapism linked with prescription drug use can result in permanent penile injury
and impotence if not treated within four to eight hours after its onset." 45 The
court pointed to the affidavit of Thom's urological expert and two medical arti-
cles to support this proposition.46 However, the court did not indicate that the
evidence attested to the state of medical knowledge at the time of Thom's pre-
scription. Indeed, as the court noted, the medical articles it cited "were pub-
ardly or selectively, and the logic of 'post hoc, ergo propter hoc' does not suffice to demonstrate
that the first event causes the second. Consequently, while anecdotal evidence can be suggestive,
it can also be quite misleading."); discussion supra note 35.
41 Id. at 850.
42 Id. at 854-55 n.1. The court even notes that the "evidence of trazodone's association with
priapism is not being used to show that Serzone actually caused priapism."
43 Id. at 855.
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lished well after Mr. Thom was prescribed Serzone." 47 Because, as one court
noted, "[a] manufacturer can only be required to warn of risks known during the
time in which the plaintiff was using the product in question," the finding of a
material fact on this point is questionable.
In any case, whether the maximum length of time to avoid permanent
damage is four hours or twenty-four, either one should suffice to put physicians
on notice of a significant, specific, and urgent risk that might arise. It is gener-
ally not up to the manufacturer to prescribe treatment for potential side effects.
49
Instead, the physician uses her best judgment in deciding whether to prescribe
the drug in light of the particular patient's unique circumstances. The physician
also has the primary responsibility to set up a plan for discontinuing treatment in
the event of an adverse reaction - including determining how long is too long.
Assuming that BMS did not misrepresent its knowledge - and there is little or
no evidence that it did - there is still no material question of fact with regard to
the adequacy of the warning.
50
Given that Thorn's second and third supporting rationales are question-
able, the primary rationale seems to be the first - the "equivocal" nature of the
warning. The implication of Thom, then, is that absent an unequivocal state-
ment of causation between a drug and purported side effects, a warning cannot
be adequate as a matter of law. In the next part, we suggest that this approach
should be rejected.
IV. ADEQUACY IN THE FACE OF CAUSAL UNCERTAINTY
Courts should hesitate to follow Thorn when confronted with warnings
that profess to something less than a causal connection. The Thorn approach
gives insufficient consideration to the warning's specific description of the risk.
It is also in tension with the purposes of the learned intermediary doctrine. Fi-
nally, it places manufacturers in a difficult position with respect to the FDA and
poses risks to doctors and patients.
47 Id. at 855 n.2. The court also pointed to an affidavit wherein Thom's urological expert
indicated that "low-flow priapism is a medical emergency that requires medical intervention and
resolution within four to eight hours of the onset in order to prevent permanent injury." However,
there is no mention of how recently the expert (or science in general) came to this conclusion.
48 Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Chapman, 180 Ind. App. 33, 50 (1979).
49 See, e.g., Ziliak v. Astra Zeneca, 324 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 2003).
52 See also Martin v. Hacker, 83 N.Y.2d 1, 11-12 (1993) (citations omitted) for the proposi-
tion that even if the time period mentioned in the warning is seen as creating some confusion,
"contradictions will not create a question of fact as to the warning's adequacy, if the language of a
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A. Specific Risk Described
We first want to examine the role that a description of a specific adverse
effect will play in the adequacy of a warning. On one hand, we are not suggest-
ing that the mere mention of a possible injury is necessarily adequate. 5  How-
ever, even when a causal connection is unknown (and perhaps especially in such
cases), courts should place significant weight on whether the warning describes
what the manufacturer knows about the specific adverse effect that a plaintiff
later alleges. In conveying specific reports of maladies associated with the drug
(even if there is not enough to prove causation), such a warning will serve its
purpose of informing the physician so that she can make a reasoned judgment in
deciding whether or not, in light of the possible connection between the drug
and the adverse reports, to prescribe the drug. In Thorn, the Serzone warnings
twice described the possibility of priapism - the exact adverse effect suffered
by Mr. Thom - in addition to expressing urgency and providing instructions in
the event of a prolonged erection.52 Nonetheless, the Thorn court did not find it
adequate as a matter of law.
In contrast, numerous courts have found it highly significant - if not
dispositive - that the defendant warns of the specific risk in question.53 In
Ziliak, for example, where the plaintiff had developed glaucoma, cataracts, and
high intraocular pressure, the court found an adequate warning which stated that
"rare instances of glaucoma, increased intraocular pressure, and cataracts have
been reported following the inhaled administration of corticosteroids."54 Other
courts, while recognizing the significance of the specific mention of a risk,
found a warning inadequate for other reasons.
55
51 See Stahl v. Norvartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 258, 266-67 (5th Cir. 2002).
52 See Thom v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, 353 F.3d 848, 854-55 (10th Cir. 2003).
53 See, e.g., Austin v. Will-Burt Co., 361 F.3d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 2004) ("In Mississippi, a
warning may be held adequate as a matter of law where the adverse effect was one that the manu-
facturer specifically warned against." (citing Cather v. Catheter Tech. Corp., 753 F.Supp. 634, 640
(S.D. Miss. 1991))); Ziliak, 324 F.3d at 521 (holding warning adequate where manufacturer
"wam[ed] doctors that specific adverse side effects are associated with the use of a drug"); Vi-
tanza v. Upjohn Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 124, 132 n. 9 (D. Conn. 1999) ("The plaintiff does not appear
to contest the adequacy of the defendant's [warnings] to the medical community or to [the physi-
cian] directly, nor could she, given that the defendant warned of the specific risk at issue in this
case."); but see Erony v. Alza Corp., 913 F. Supp. 195, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (question of fact
where the warning instructed to keep out of reach of children and warned that severe hypoventila-
tion could result and require medical treatment, but did not say that the resulting complications
could be serious enough to result in death).
54 Ziliak, 324 F.3d at 519.
55 See, e.g., Golod v. Hoffinan La Roche, 964 F.Supp. 841, 853-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (question
of fact where plaintiff lost eyesight and "the package inserts did specify the general type of side
effect-corneal abnormalities and iritis-that led to the demise of Golod's eye ... [but] indicated
that the side effects were temporary and resolved after [drug use] was discontinued").
[Vol. 107
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As in Ziliak, it might well be appropriate for a warning to describe spe-
cific effects as "rare." As long as it conveys the manufacturer's constructive
knowledge, such a warning gives the prescribing physician an accurate picture
of the risks associated with the drug so that she can make an informed decision.
In Plummer v. Lederle Laboratories, for example, the warnings stated that
[plaralytic disease following the ingestion of live poliovirus
vaccines has been, on rare occasions, reported in individuals
receiving the vaccine, as well as in persons who were in close
contact with vaccines.... The risk of a vaccine-associated pa-
ralysis is extremely small for vaccines, susceptible family mem-
bers and other close personal contacts.
56
In Plummer, the causal connection between the vaccine and the adverse effect
was known, and the rate of incidence was known to be infrequent.
However, there is scant difference between knowing a risk to be definite
albeit minute and saying so (as in Plummer) and knowing that only few cases of
an adverse effect were reported - but not knowing if they are causally related
- and similarly saying so (as with priapism in Thom). In each case, the warn-
ing provides doctors with the most accurate information available so that the
doctor can use her expert judgment in deciding whether or not to prescribe the
drug. As such, Thom's insistence on something more makes very little sense.
Courts should be willing to find a warning adequate as a matter of law as long as
a manufacturer accurately conveys its knowledge of the drug - even if the po-
tential harm has only been observed infrequently and even if the manufacturer is
unable to definitively state a causal connection - especially if the manufacturer
warned of the specific condition for which the plaintiff later brought suit.
This is not to say that a warning must necessarily mention the specific
condition that a plaintiff later complains of in order to be an adequate warning
as a matter of law. In some cases, it might be impractical or impossible to name
all possible specific risks - either because they are too numerous or because
they are unknown.57 Along these lines, one court found a warning adequate
because "[t]he physician was told under no circumstances to inject the drug into
subcutaneous tissue, although he was not told that necrosis might result from his
violation of this instruction," rejecting the notion that "'the duty of the defen-
56 Plummer, 819 F.2d 349, 352 (2d. Cir. 1987) (emphasis added) ("Even assuming... that the
warnings did minimize the risk of contracting contact polio, the fact remains that the probability
of contracting either contact polio or wild polio is extremely remote.").
57 See, e.g., Ralston v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 275 F.3d 965, 976 (10th Cir. 2001)
("While Ralston prefers that these warnings be more specific, Kansas law does not require that a
warning warn against every conceivable risk under every conceivable circumstance. Rather, as
already discussed, Kansas requires only that the warnings be 'reasonable under the circum-
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dant extended to explaining exactly how the danger against which he had been
warned might operate. -58
In sum, when a court is faced with evaluating the adequacy of a warning
with regard to a condition with an uncertain causal link to the drug, the manu-
facturer might be unable to make many concrete statements, having to rely on
inconclusive studies and informal observations. In such a context, therefore, it
makes sense to place significant weight on the fact that a warning specifically
describes a condition that later becomes subject of a lawsuit, even if that de-
scription does not state a causal connection.
B. Purpose of a Learned Intermediary
As previously explained, the learned intermediary doctrine represents a
distribution of responsibility between the drug manufacturers and the doctors,
where each side understands the other's role. Even when the causal effects of a
given drug are uncertain, the manufacturer's duty is to provide the doctor with
what it knows about the drug; it is the doctor's place to utilize this information.
Thorn undermined this balance by effectively precluding a warning from being
adequate when the underlying science is uncertain. Under Thorn's approach, a
drug company cannot be sure that it has discharged its duty, creating a tendency
to "overwarn." 59 In turn, a doctor will not be sure that the warnings represent
accurate information and might either under-prescribe certain drugs or inappro-
priately discount all warnings.
In Thorn, the court also upset the balance between manufacturers and
doctors when it transferred a portion of the responsibility for developing an ap-
propriate monitoring regimen. The manufacturer's blanket statement of seeking
help "immediately" should not be read as a substitute to a physician's expert
knowledge, but as a signal to a learned intermediary. In contrast to Thorn, the
court in Ziliak more readily assumes that the doctor is competent to perform his
role: "If a pharmaceutical manufacturer warns doctors that specific adverse side
effects are associated with the use of a drug, then ... implicit in the warning...
is the doctor's need to monitor the patient and to consider alternative thera-
pies." The court also emphasizes that the doctor "took the risks that Ziliak
would develop adverse side effects into account when prescribing [the drug]." 61
58 Pfizer v. Jones, 221 Va. 681, 684 (1990) (quoting Sadler v. Lynch, 192 Va. 344, 349
(1951)).
59 See, e.g., Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc., 273 F.3d 785, 797 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Trials of tort
claims pose incentives to overwarn: 'the visible monetary costs of additional warnings are typi-
cally quite low--a few pennies for a bit more paper and a little more ink."' (quoting James A.
Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of
Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 297 (1990))).
60 Ziliak v. Astra Zeneca, 324 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 2003).
61 Id. It is curious that the court in Thorn did not even mention Ziliak, even though the latter is
a sister circuit's recent pronouncement on the learned intermediary doctrine, handed down only a
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Even when there is no scientific proof of causation, the purposes of the learned
intermediary doctrine are best served if courts recognize that a warning can still
be adequate as a matter of law if the manufacturer discharges its duty by inform-
ing the doctor of what it knows.
C. The FDA
Allowing adequacy in the face of causal uncertainty also comports with
the FDA's oversight of prescription drugs. In contrast, the Thorn approach, by
implicitly requiring a statement of a causal connection even when causation is
unknown as a prerequisite to finding a warning adequate as a matter of law,
places defendants in an untenable position with respect to FDA regulations.
Warning labels must be FDA-approved as part of a new drug applica-
tion and any changes to a prescription drug's labeling must be approved by the
FDA. 62 Failure to secure approval can result in a determination that the drug is
"misbranded" and can be accompanied by regulatory and enforcement actions,
including injunction, 63 seizure, 64 and criminal prosecution. 65 One court summa-
rized the regulations as follows:
The FDCA prohibits a drug manufacturer from marketing a new
drug unless the FDA has approved the drug as both safe and ef-
fective for its intended use. In addition to scientific and ex-
perimental data, a new drug application must include a pro-
posed label. If the FDA determines that the labeling is false or
misleading in any way, the drug is deemed "misbranded," and
the FDA will reject the application for approval of the drug.
Once an application has been approved, any change in the label-
ing requires a supplement to the application and approval by the
FDA, either before or after the change.
66
FDA regulations do allow for limited circumstances in which manufacturers
may make temporary labeling changes prior to FDA approval, but they are sub-
few months before Thorn. See generally Thorn v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 848-
58 (10th Cir. 2003).
62 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(F) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (2003).
63 21 U.S.C. § 332 (2000).
64 21 U.S.C. §§ 33 1(b), 344(a) (2000).
65 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (2000).
66 Dowhal v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, 32 Cal. 4th 910, 919 (2004) (finding
California law preempted by FDA labeling requirements) (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 352, 355 (2000); 21
C.F.R. §§ 314.70, 314.71 (2004)).
20051
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ject to subsequent approval or rejection by the FDA. 67 However, the approval
required for a labeling change - even to comply with state recuirements that
purport to impose liability - is not always readily forthcoming. Daniel Troy,
who was then Chief Counsel of the FDA, once opined: "You can't put anything
on the label without coming to us first or getting our blessing .... We have ab-
solute control over the label." 69 He furthermore argued that, absent proof of
scientific causation - and particularly when the FDA has itself specifically
failed to find causation - it is inappropriate to include statements of causation
in the warning materials: "[E]nhancing the warnings in the labeling of SSRls
[selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors] in the absence of scientific evidence
actually could be misleading and could misbrand the drugs under . . . the
FDCA."'70 These comments, made in the larger context of the ongoing debate
over the preemptive effect of FDA labeling requirements, 71 serve to highlight
the potential difficulties that a pharmaceutical company could face in the event
that it attempted to alter the label on products with uncertain causal effects.
At the same time, the FDA has made it clear that it can require a warn-
ing even absent proof of causation if it sees fit.72 In one such instance, the FDA
67 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6). This section provides:
The agency may designate a category of changes for the purpose of providing
that, in the case of a change in such category, the holder of an approved appli-
cation may commence distribution of the drug product involved upon receipt
by the agency of a supplement [i.e. a request] for the change. These changes
include, but are not limited to:
(iii) Changes in the labeling to accomplish any of the following:
(A) To add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution,
or adverse reaction[.]
Id. This version was enacted in 2004. See 69 Fed. Reg. 18,728, at 18,764-66 (Apr. 8, 2004). The
prior version of this provision appeared at 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(2)(i) (2003).
68 See Dowhal, 32 Cal. 4th at 921; Daniel E. Troy, FDA Involvement in Product Liability
Lawsuits, FDLI UPDATE 4 (Jan/Feb. 2003) ("FDA has prohibited manufacturers from labeling
their products voluntarily with a [state law] warning .... [Ulsing additional warning language...
could render their products misbranded under the... FDCA.").
69 Michael Kranish, FDA Counsel's Rise Embodies US. Shift, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 22, 2002,
at Al (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Daniel Troy); see also James T. O'Reilly, A
State of Extinction: Does Food and Drug Administration Approval of a Prescription Drug Label
Extinguish State Claims for Inadequate Warning?, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 287, 293 (2003).
70 Troy, supra note 68, at 6 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 352(a)).
71 The topic of federal preemption is beyond the scope of, albeit related to, this piece. For a
discussion of preemption, see, e.g., David G. Owen, Federal Preemption of Products Liability
Claims, 55 S.C. L. REv. 411 (2003).
72 Labeling of Diphenhydramine-Containing Drug Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use,
67 Fed. Reg. 72,555, 72,556 (Dec. 6, 2002) ("To mandate a warning, or take similar regulatory
action, FDA need not show, nor do we allege, actual causation.").
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explained this decision based in part on the magnitude of the risk: "The agency
recognizes that the number of reports is small compared to the total doses used.
However, there is a particular concern because of the reports of toxic psychosis,
especially in children . . . ."73 The report goes on to note that "[t]his judgment
balances the benefits of these drug products against their potential risks, and
reflects our conclusion that even a potential link between the overuse of diphen-
hydramine and serious adverse health consequences warrants this action."
74
Such judgments are appropriately within the purview of the FDA, which, as the
public health agency with expertise in the field, is better situated than generalist
courts to assess prescription drug causality and labeling requirements.7 5  The
Supreme Court has often had occasion to comment on the superior position of
agencies in general and the FDA in particular, in matters requiring specialized
expertise. 76 The Thom approach, however, encourages court-defined rather than
73 67 Fed. Reg. at 72,555.
74 67 Fed. Reg. at 72,556 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 330.10(a) (2002)).
75 The FDA explained its view, as quoted in a recent preemption case involving medical de-
vices, as follows:
[l]t is inappropriate for a jury to second-guess FDA's scientific judgment on
such a matter that is within FDA's particular expertise .... The agency makes
a reasoned and deliberate decision as to the correct pathway of regulation and
whether to approve the device. Juries lack the scientific knowledge and tech-
nical expertise necessary to make such judgments....
[T]he prospect of hundreds of individual juries determining the propriety of
particular device approvals, or the appropriate standards to apply to those ap-
provals, is the antithesis of the orderly scheme Congress put in place and
charged the FDA with implementing.
Such uncertainty as to the status of medical devices would create chaos for
both the regulated industry and FDA.
Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 178 (3d Cir. 2004) (first ellipse added) (other alterations in
original) (citation omitted).
76 See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat'l Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87,
103 (1983) ("When examining this kind of scientific determination [by a federal agency] . . . a
reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential."); Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 653-54 (1973) ("Evaluation of conflicting reports as to the reputation of
drugs among experts in the field is not a matter well left to a court without chemical or medical
background. The determination whether a drug is generally recognized as safe and effective [un-
der the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act] necessarily implicates complex chemical and pharmacol-
ogical considerations. Threshold questions within the peculiar expertise of an administrative
agency are appropriately routed to the agency, while the court stays its hand."); Far East Confer-
ence v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952) ("[I]n cases raising issues of fact not within
the conventional experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion,
agencies created by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed over ....
Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency are se-
cured, and the limited functions of review by the judiciary are more rationally exercised, by pre-
liminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues to agen-
cies that are better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained through experience,
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FDA-defined warnings. This places drug companies in a difficult position,
sandwiched between the risk of liability on one hand and the risk of an FDA
violation for "misbranding" on the other.
D. Effects on Manufacturers, Doctors, and Patients
If courts insist on an unequivocal statement of causation, discounting
the possibility that warnings on drugs with uncertain effects will be adequate as
a matter of law, it could impair the interests of manufacturers, doctors, and con-
sumers. First, a manufacturer of such drugs will be unable to know in advance
what it is required to include in its warning. The manufacturer will face an in-
creased risk of liability because - no matter what language is used in a warning
- a jury might find it inadequate. Second, insofar as this results in warnings
with unwarranted statements of causation, doctors' ability to rely on the warn-
ings for an accurate picture of the risks involved will be impaired. A warning
attesting to a causal relationship conveys a very different message to the doctor
than one that says there have been reports of a temporal association. If concrete
statements of causation are required across the board, it will be difficult to dis-
tinguish between the known effects and the suspected effects, thus impairing
doctors' ability to use their reasoned judgment to make decisions in individual
cases. Doctors will be relying on warnings dictated by the courts rather than by
science. Third, such warnings could lead to under-prescription of drugs, depriv-
ing patients of their benefits.
Instead, the Thorn approach should be rejected in favor of an approach
that allows manufacturers to conform their conduct to a known rule of law -
placing significant emphasis on whether the potential for a specific adverse ef-
fect is accurately, clearly and unambiguously described in the warning. This
would encourage manufacturers to provide accurate warnings even when causa-
tion is uncertain (as in Thorn) and would encourage doctors to use their reasoned
judgment in such cases to balance the risks and benefits.
V. CONCLUSION
Scientific causation is often uncertain when it comes to the side effects
of drugs. Even when causation is fuzzy, however, courts should recognize that
there must be some set of warnings that the manufacturer can include such that
they are adequate as a matter of law to inform a learned intermediary of the risks
known at that point in time - especially when the warnings describe a specific
risk that later materializes. Courts should apply the learned intermediary doc-
trine in a way that encourages manufacturers to disclose what they know -
and by more flexible procedure.").
77 See Troy, supra note 68, at 6 (arguing that "overwarning presents a substantial risk of dis-
couraging" the use of drugs in appropriate cases).
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whether or not that disclosure reveals a causal connection. If courts insist on a
statement of causation even when such a link is uncertain, it will subvert the
purposes of the learned intermediary doctrine, place manufacturers in an unten-
able position facing the FDA on one side and a jury on the other, and impair the
interests of doctors and patients.
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